Spring Break
Moral Presence and Absence in William James' Rhetoric of Truth
An Essay
Michael Modarelli, University of Tennessee
Issue date: 6/1/08 Section: Spring 2008
In "Pragmatism and Radical Empiricism" ("PRE"), William James famously claims, "truth happens to an idea," and so "it becomes true, is made true by events" (312). For James, the question of whether or not an idea is true depends on verification, a process that in turn verifies itself as true. The question of validity, however, poses some interesting concerns regarding "truth" as it relates to individuals and "truth" within individuals. Because James constantly refuses to begin with definitions regarding truth-or any term, for that matter-and because he is forced to couch his process in language, he performs a rhetorical strategy in order to invoke the presence of truth. Quite often, James selects a rather structural process to determine exactly what and how we can determine the truth of something. In this essay, I will explore not only the function of James' rhetorical-and largely relativistic, I argue-method of truth, but also, and I think more importantly, the purpose of this rhetorical structure. I claim that in order to understand the rhetoric of James' theory of truth, we must first understand how James employs notions of presence and absence in these writings, and the way in which James employs these terms is fundamental to individual truth.
Truth maintains a prominent place in James' moral philosophy, because, as Ellen Kappy Suckiel notes, "truth in the first instance, for James, is truth for the individual" (105). But how can we connect truth with morality when the moral structure of James' thought seems so vague? Hilary and Ruth Anna Putnam, in defense of their contributions to the Cambridge Companion to William James, claim that James was not essentially a moral philosopher, although a strong underpinning of moral philosophy serves as the foundation for his philosophy (366). The Putnams go on to argue that while James did not intentionally frame his philosophy in ethics, certain consequentialist motives provided direction for him.1 I think we can grant that at least this latter idea is true for James-certainly, some outcomes seem better than others because of consequences. And, I would agree, James' moral philosophy, were we to ascribe one to him, does find its roots in his conception of truth.
Truth maintains a prominent place in James' moral philosophy, because, as Ellen Kappy Suckiel notes, "truth in the first instance, for James, is truth for the individual" (105). But how can we connect truth with morality when the moral structure of James' thought seems so vague? Hilary and Ruth Anna Putnam, in defense of their contributions to the Cambridge Companion to William James, claim that James was not essentially a moral philosopher, although a strong underpinning of moral philosophy serves as the foundation for his philosophy (366). The Putnams go on to argue that while James did not intentionally frame his philosophy in ethics, certain consequentialist motives provided direction for him.1 I think we can grant that at least this latter idea is true for James-certainly, some outcomes seem better than others because of consequences. And, I would agree, James' moral philosophy, were we to ascribe one to him, does find its roots in his conception of truth.
Viewing Comments 1 - 1 of 1
Russian Personals
posted 3/18/10 @ 10:40 PM EST
I have to agree with teh poster above... :/ looks like a lot of hot air to me.
Post a Comment